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Balman: Bush v. Gore--A Response to Dean Belsky

RESPONSE
BUSH V. GORE-A RESPONSE TO DEAN BELSKY
Steven K. Balman*
"Let me tell you about Florida politicians. I make them out of whole cloth,
just like a tailor makes a suit. I get their name in the newspaper. I get
them some publicity and get them on the ballot. Then after the election,
we count the votes. And if they don't turn out right, we recount them.
And recount them again. Until they do."
-Edward

G. Robinson to Humphrey Bogart in Key Largo'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Dean Martin H. Belsky wrote "Bush v. Gore-A Critique of
Critiques" 2 before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. When
Belsky wrote his article on the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Bush v. Gore,3 the twin towers of the World Trade Center were still
standing, and the press still called George W. Bush "Dubya." Since
September 11, George W. Bush has gained a reputation as a competent
and effective wartime President. 4 His approval ratings have soared to 90
percent. 5 Even the New York Times has acknowledged that President
have even compared
Bush had a "new gravitas."6 Some commentators
7
President Bush to Winston Churchill.
Before Belsky wrote his article, several supporters of Al Gore, the
man defeated in the 2000 Presidential election, wrote angry
denunciations of Bush v. Gore. The critics blamed the Supreme Court
* Member, Bar of the State of Oklahoma; Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of
Tulsa College of Law; A.B. Harvard University, 1978; J.D. University of Texas, 1981.
1. Overtimel 7he Election 2000 ThrIller 14 (Larry J. Sabato ed., Longman 2001).
2. Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore-A Critique of Critiques,37 Tulsa L. Rev. 45 (2001).
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
4. Leaders: The Difference a Year Makes, The Economist 11 (Jan. 12, 2002).
5. Bush's Job Approval Rating Soars in Poll, Reuters 1 (Jan. 28, 2002).
6. Mr. Bush's New Gravitas,N.Y. Times A24 (Oct. 12, 2001).
7. Dana Milbank, In This Crisis, the Choices in Words Are Churchill's,Wash. Post A15
(Oct. 30, 2001).
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for Gore's loss of the election. In particular, the critics blamed the Court
for Gore's loss of the "post-election campaign- Gore's extraordinary
and unprecedented effort to win the Presidency by litigating in the state
courts of Florida."
The editors' comments in The New Republic were typical. They
accused the Court of staging a "judicial putsch"-a coup d'6tat:
George W. Bush's presidency will forever be haunted by James Madison's
ghost. Constitutionally speaking, this presidency is ill gotten. It is the
prize of a judicial putsch.... George W. Bush won the election but Al
Gore won the vote. And the Supreme Court of the United States has made
itself a party to this dread of democratic truth. We disrespectfully
dissent. 9
Professor Alan M. Dershowitz of the Harvard Law School1 ° also
considered the Bush v. Gore decision "lawless." He stated in his book:
The five Justices who ended election 2000... have damaged the
credibility of the U.S. Supreme Court and their lawless decision...
promises to have a more enduring impact on Americans than the outcome
of the election itself.11
In so voting, they [the five-vote majority] shamed themselves and the
Court on which they serve, and they defiled their places in history. 12
Bush v. Gore was a 5-4 decision. The five Justices who, according
to Dershowitz, "defiled their places in history" were Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. They found the
recount was conducted in a manner that was so arbitrary and so
standardless that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 13 The five
Justices also found that there was no way for the Supreme Court of
Florida-the court that had ordered the standardless recount-to
correct the problem. A federal statute made December 12, 2000 the
deadline for completing the election and there was no time for Florida to
adopt appropriate standards and conduct a proper recount.14

8. See e.g. Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, in Bush v. Gore: The
Court Cases and the Commentary 311 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings
Instn. Press 2001).
9. E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol, Unsafe Harbor,in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases
and the Commentary 317-18 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn.
Press 2001).
10. Professor Alan M. Dershowitz is perhaps best known as one of the defense lawyers
for O.J. Simpson and Claus Von Bulow. Professor Dershowitz also makes frequent
appearances on television news programs.
11. Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hgacked Election 2000 3
(Oxford U. Press 2001).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.
14. Id. at I10.
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According to Dershowitz, the actions of the five Justices were
"unprincipled" and "partisan:"
[There is... widespread popular outrage at what the high court did...
land when the Court members] act in an unprincipled and partisan
manner-as they did in Bush v. Gore-they risk losing respect and
frittering away the moral capital accumulated by their predecessors over
generations.' 5
Dershowitz was not the only law professor to express such views. Over
600 law professors signed an electronic petition and took out an
advertisement in The New York Times. The law professors accused the
Court of acting in a non-judicial fashion when it enjoyed the recount of
votes in the Florida Presidential election.16
Other critics were even more shrill. They compared Bush v. Gore to
Dred Scott v. Sanford,17 the infamous decision that denied the humanity
of African Americans and recognized the rights of slaveholders. The
decision was debated by Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas in the
Lincoln-Douglas debates, and did much to precipitate the Civil War.18
Belsky, in contrast, is not shrill. If Belsky is angry about the result
of Bush v. Gore, he keeps his emotions to himself. He disagrees with the
ultimate result in the case, but only reveals his position and his
reasoning in the last two pages of his article.' 9 Throughout, Belsky
takes the approach of Dragnet's Sergeant Joe Friday: "Just the facts,
ma'am." Unlike Sergeant Friday-and unlike most critics of Bush v.
Gore-Belsky uses humor. He quotes Yogi Berra. If, as Horace Walpole
observed, "[tihe world is a tragedy to those who feel, but a comedy to
those who think," Belsky is clearly a thinker.
According to the critics, the most fundamental question about Bush

15. Dershowitz, supran. 11, at 5-6.
16. 673 Law Professors Say <http://www.the-rule-of-law.com/statement.html>
(accessed Feb. 5, 2002). The law professors' use of the name "the-rule-of-law.cor" is
curious. It may be intended to indicate approval of Justice Steven's assertion that
"[a]lthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this
year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian to the rule of law." Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. at 128-29.
At least some of the 600 law professors are "Pomos'--postmodernists-and
"Crits"-participants in the Critical Legal Studies movement. Pomos and Crits normally
have as much enthusiasm for the "rule of law" as members of the Harvard Divinity School
have for tent revivals. For example, one of the 600 professors is Pierre Schlag, who
compares law to phrenology, in Law and Phrenology, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 877 (1997).
Schlag's article rejects the viability of the rule of law, and is otherwise opaque.
17. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
18. Rosen, supra n. 8, at 312. See The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the
United States 759-61 (Kermit L. Hall ed., Oxford U. Press 1992) ("American legal and
constitutional scholars consider the Dred Scott decision to be the worst ever rendered by
the Supreme Court. Historians have abundantly documented its role in crystallizing
attitudes that led to war."); Walter Ehrlich, They Have No Rghts: Dred Scott's Strugglefor
Freedom(Greenwood Press 1979).
19. Belsky, supran. 2, at 78-79.
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v. Gore was whether the decision was political? 20 Were the Justices in
Bush v. Gore acting as judges or politicians? Belsky discusses this very
serious question in the central part of his article:
On a philosophic level, the decision in Bush v. Gore will be seen as just
another example of the real world. Are the Justices of the Supreme Court
political? Are the Justices ideological? Are the Justices biased toward
certain people, ideas, and perspectives? Surprise, surprise!
Traditional scholars, legal realists, critical legal scholars, and postmodernists can all agree that decisions, even or especially those of the
United States Supreme Court, are not based on fixed precedents and
doctrines but include the judge's history and personality.
My now
deceased colleague, Chapman Professor Bernard Schwartz, documented
this in his books reviewing drafts of Supreme Court opinions.
Here, supposed "states rights" Justices overruled a state's highest court.
Justices who had not been proponents of voters' rights urged a new
application of equal protection to safeguard such rights. Supposed
activist judges urged restraint and even avoidance whereas individual and
federal rights proponents argued for acceptance of a state decision
rejecting claims of equal protection. If there was bias, argued others, it
was the partisanship of the Florida courts. To quote my favorite legal
scholar, Yogi Berra, in this and in most situations: "Where you stand,
depends on where you sit."
That said, we should expect, and did in fact receive, partisanship. Now,
let's move on to the bases of the Court's actions and their legitimacy. 21
Significantly, Belsky does not limit his allegation of partisanship to the
five majority Justices. He suggests that all parties, including the Florida
Supreme Court, were motivated at least in part by politics.

22

Belsky directly attacks Dershowitz' conclusion that the Court
sacrificed its institutional legitimacy and frittered away moral capital
accumulated "over generations." According to Belsky,
It is naive to believe that there will be any lasting impact on public
confidence in the Judiciary because of its decision in Bush v. Gore. Even
outrageous decisions, such as those on slavery, segregation and
Japanese-American interment, which have been universally condemned,
did not lead to permanent disrespect to the Court. Other decisions which
caused deep splits in the public response, such as those on abortion,

20. Rosen, supran.8, at 311-16.
21. Belsky, supran.2, at 71-72.
22. Id. Belsky's observation that judicial decisions are motivated at least in part by
politics is not novel. See Hall, supra n. 18, at 373-404 ("History of the Court"). Erwin
Chemerinsky has written, "Ithe emperor has no clothes. Justices inescapably must-and
should-make value choices interpreting the Constitution.... This, of course, is what
constitutional law has always been about."
Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond
Federalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 13
(2001) (written prior to the Bush v. Gore decision).
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school prayer, and suspect rights, may have led to anger, attempts to
"reign in the Court," and debates on the selection of future Justices. They
2
did not, however, lead to a wholesale rejection of legitimacy of the Court. 3
Of course, Belsky is right. Opinion polls confirm that the public has not
lost confidence in the Court. The public has gained confidence in
Bush.2 4
Belsky also confronts Dershowitz in a more indirect and subtle way.
Dershowitz believes that Bush v. Gore is "unprincipled" and "lawless." It
is possible, however, to read Belsky's article as a refutation of
Dershowitz. Refuting Dershowitz may not be an intended purpose, or
even a conscious effect of Belsky's article, but sometimes effects overtake
intentions.
II.

THE DERSHOWITZ CHALLENGE

In Supreme Injustice: How The High Court Hyacked Election 2000,
Dershowitz throws down the gauntlet: "I challenge any law professor or
Supreme Court litigator to defend the majority's equal protection
conclusion and remedy in a public debate."25
Belsky quotes this
challenge, "The Dershowitz Challenge," in a footnote.2"
The "majority's equal protection conclusion" is not the same as the
majority's equal protection "remedy."
Seven Justices reached the
conclusion that the statewide recount ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court was arbitrary, and accordingly violated the requirements of equal
protection (and, incidentally, due process). 7
The recount ordered by the Supreme Court was arbitrary in at least
three different ways. First, the Florida Supreme Court ordered partial
recount totals from three counties to be included in the total. The three
counties were Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Broward. Each of the
counties "used varying standards to determine what was a legal vote."28
Second, the Florida Supreme Court treated undervotes differently

23. Belsky, supran. 2, at 70.
24. Byron York, The Reassuring President, Natl. Rev. Online (Jan. 28, 2002)
<http://www.nationalreview.com/york/yorkO12502.shtml> (accessed Feb. 21, 2002).
25. Dershowitz, supra n. 11, at 84.
26. Belsky, supran. 2, at 74 n. 256.
27. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109-10 (-The record provides some examples. A monitor in
Miami Dade testified at trial that he observed that three members of the county canvassing
board applied different standards in defining a legal vote. And testimony at trial also
revealed that a least one county changed its evaluative standards during the counting
process. Palm Beach County, for example, began the process with a 1990 guideline which
precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that considered a vote to
be legal if any light could be seen through a chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then
abandoned any pretence of a per se rule, only to have a court order that the county
consider dimpled chads legal. This is not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal
treatment." (citation omitted)).
28. Id. at 106-07.
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than overvotes. 2 9 An overvote is a ballot that contains more than one
vote for the same office. An undervote is a ballot that contains no vote
for one or more offices. The Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount of
undervotes. The partial recount total from the three counties included
overvotes.°
Third, the Florida Supreme Court did not "specify who would
recount the ballots."3 1 Joseph Stalin once observed that "Those who cast
" 32
the votes decide nothing; those who count the votes decide everything.
In the statewide recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, different
county election boards, called canvassing boards, scrambled to assemble
teams of judges to do the recount. Some of the judges had "no previous
training in handling and interpreting... ballots."3 3
Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice David Souter also found that
the statewide recount violated equal protection. 34 However, the two
Justices did not agree with the majority's remedy, which ended the
recounting of Presidential ballots. 5
Justices Souter and Breyer believed the proper remedy for the equal
protection violation would have been to remand the case to the Florida
Supreme Court with instructions to establish uniform standards for the
recount. 36 Belsky sympathizes with the Souter-Breyer position. He
believes that the Supreme Court should have remanded the case to the
Florida Supreme Court. 37 Notwithstanding his ultimate conclusion,
Belsky appears to take on the task of debating Dershowitz as an
intellectual exercise.
Belsky's defense of the Court's equal protection conclusion consists
of seven steps:
1. Federal constitutional doctrines apply to election challenges. 8
2. Election challenges are a proper subject for judicial review.3 9
3. Strict scrutiny of deviations from the one-person-one-vote

29. Id. at 107-08.
30. Id. at 108.
31. Id. at 109.
32. Einer Elhauge, The Lessons of Florida2000, Policy Rev. 15, 19 (Dec. 2001 & Jan.
2002); Sabato, supra n. 1, at v.
33. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.
34. See id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., concurring in part); id. at 134 (Souter, J., concurring in

part).
35. Id. at 110-11.
36. Id. at 129-35.
37. Belsky, supran. 2, at 76-78.
38. Id. at 74-75. See Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Hall, supran. 18, at 899-902.
39. Belsky, supra n. 2, at 75. Dershowitz appears to argue that Reynolds v. Sims and
other reapportionment cases were about discrimination against blacks and urban dwellers.
See Dershowitz, supra n. 11, at 71-78. Belsky's treatment of the right to vote as a
fundamental constitutional right-a right that can be vindicated in federal court-is more
conventional. See e.g. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 277 (rev. ed., Vintage
2001).
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standard is not required.
Some flexibility would be allowed to preserve the normal
functioning of state governments and for minor population
differences. Politics is an acceptable component of an election
process, but cannot be allowed to go so far as to intentionally
frustrate the will of the majority or to intentionally discriminate
against an identified minority of the votes.40
4. The state standard"the intent of the voter"-is acceptable.
When that standard is "so loosely applied as to allow arbitrary
and disparate treatment" to dilute the "weight of a citizen's vote,"
then it is appropriate for the Court to act.4 '
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the
exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for
implementing elections.
Instead, we are presented with a
situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity
has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural
safeguards. When a court orders a statewide remedy, there
must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary
requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are
satisfied.42
5. There must be some standards for counting votes. Votes cannot
be counted without a standard for determining whether a vote is
43
legal.
6. It is possible to frame a uniform standard for determining the
"intent of the voter." An "arbitrary and capricious" test could be
used."4
7. The statewide recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court
was so arbitrary and so resulted in disparate treatment as to be
standardless. The statewide recount was not requested by the
parties. Procedural safeguards that could have been utilized
were not adopted.45
Belsky's defense of the equal protection conclusion-the argument
endorsed by seven Justices-is overt and express. His defense of the
equal protection remedy is a matter of inference and interpretation.
Belsky says: "[ihf the equal protection basis for the decision had merely
led to a remand to the Florida Supreme Court, and the court had had the
time to develop standardsfor a recount there would have been little

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Belsky, supran. 2, at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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46
criticism of the Supreme Court"
The essential part of Belsky's statement is the qualifying language:
"and the court had had the time to develop standards for a recount."
Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court did not have time to develop
standards for a recount. The recount would necessarily have to be
completed by December 12, 2000. 47 A federal statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5,
governs the selection of Presidential electors. The statute provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for
the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and
such determination shall have been made at least six days before the time
fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to
such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said
time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as
hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed
by such State is concerned.4 8
December 18, 2000, was the day fixed for the meeting of the
Electoral College. December 12, 2000, was six days before December
18. Belsky describes 3 U.S.C. § 5 as a "Safe Harbor" provision that
establishes "a mechanism for the presumptive validity of state election
returns. If a state has a procedure for the final selection of electors,
including resolution of all controversies, at least six days before
the date
49
set for the meeting of electors, the selection is "conclusive."
By December 12, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court had twice
indicated that the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the
presumption.50 Belsky carefully pointed out those acknowledgements of
the December 12 deadline. 5 1
Even if the December 12 Safe Harbor deadline had not applied, it
would have been impossible to devise new standards and conduct a
recount during the six days between December 12 and the December 18
meeting of the Electoral College. Remand would have been futile. The
law does not require futile acts. 2

46. Belsky, supra n. 2, at 74 (emphasis added) (citing Michael W. McConnell, Two-anda-HalfCheersfor Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 673 (2001)).
47. Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1261-62 & rn. 21-22 (Fla. 2000); See Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1273, 1281-82, 1289-91 (Fla. 2000) (per

curiam).
48. 3 U.S.C.A. § 5 (West 2001).
49. Belsky, supra n. 2, at 52.
50. Gore v. Harris,772 So.2d at 1261-62; Palm Beach County CanvassingBd., 772 So.2d
at 1281-82, 1289-91.
51. Belsky, supran.2, at 55-56.
52. Id. at 37; Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting); Elhauge, supra
n. 32, at 24-26; Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the
Constitution,and the Courts 132-46 (Princeton U. Press 2001).
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I am not sure that Belsky intentionally decided to take the
Dershowitz Challenge. I do not know whether he thinks he has refuted
Dershowitz. I had to read Dershowitz's book once and Belsky's article
three times before I saw how completely Belsky had responded to the
Dershowitz challenge.
III.

OTHER CHALLENGES, OTHER QUESIONS

"Their viewpoint is, of course, valid to them."
-Nero

Wolfe5

3

Belsky's greatest contribution to the debate on Bush v. Gore is his
objectivity. I wish that he would have been able to bring his reason and
wit more fully to bear on five other questions raised by the commentary
in Bush v. Gore:
A. Did the Bush v. Gore majority act in bad faith?
B. Is the argument based on Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution valid?
C. Did the Bush v. Gore majority betray the principles of the "New
Federalism?"
D. Can Bush v. Gore be reconciled with PlannedParenthoodof
SoutheasternPennsylvaniav. Casey?
E. Is Bush v. Gore just another battle in the Culture Wars?
A.

Did the Bush v. Gore majority act in badfaith?

As previously explained, some supporters have charged that the
Bush v. Gore majority acted in a manner that was political and partisan.
Belsky states at one point that "I will not focus directly on allegations
and counter-allegations 'politics' and on the 'partisan nature' of these
decisions."5 Belsky nevertheless concludes that politics does play a part
in judicial decisions.
The critics assume that a decision that is political cannot be a
decision that follows the rule of law. Why? It is conceivable that a
Justice could act in a manner that is simultaneously political and
principled. Belsky does not make clear whether he thinks that the Court
acted or showed fidelity to the rule of law in Bush v. Gore. Although
Belsky does not expressly state his views, it is possible to infer them. As
a preliminary matter, Belsky definitely seems to believe that it was

53. Rex Stout, Some Buried Caesar34 (Viking 1958). Nero Wolfe is reputed to be the
illegitimate son of Sherlock Holmes and Irene Adler. In manner and physical appearance,
Wolfe bears a closer resemblance to Mycroft Holmes, Sherlock's older, smarter, and more
massive brother. Jacques Barzun described Nero Wolfe as "a portrait of an Educated
Jacques Barzun, A Jacques Barzun Reader. Selections from his Works 565
Man."
(HarperCollins 2002).
54. Belsky, supra n. 2, at 68.
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appropriate for the Court to grant certiorari and to reverse the decision
of the Florida Supreme Court.
Belsky is persuaded by the equal
protection conclusion reached by seven of the nine Justices.55 Belsky is
also persuaded that it was appropriate for the Court to stay the
statewide recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.5 6 Significantly,
Belsky is critical of the remedy ordered by the Court in connection with
equal protection: he says the Court should have remanded the case to
the Supreme Court of Florida so that it could develop the standards
for a
57
recount and allow the completion of the statewide recount.
Belsky almost certainly thinks that the Court was acting politically
when it devised the equal protection remedy of remand without
restarting the recount. He stopped short, however, of directly stating
that the Court was acting in bad faith. Belsky's criticism of the remedy
ordered by the Court has three parts:
1. It was and is the State of Florida's choice to apply the federal
statutory "Safe Harbor" provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5. A state could
decide if it wanted to proceed beyond the Safe Harbor date. 58
2. "If the Constitution requires application of equal protection
standards to a voting recount, those standards should be
applied and a statute providing a choice for the decision-maker
as to the time of the decision should not be seen as a limitation,
let alone a bar. " 59
3. Congress has the ultimate right to make any final decision
about selecting the President under Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment of the Constitution. 60 "Our nation can cope with
assassinations and attempted assassinations of the President in
capacity of the President, and clouds impeachment over a
President. Surely it could cope with a few weeks' delay in
"6
deciding who is to be the President. 1
Belsky's argument is not, however, completely persuasive. First, as
Belsky himself points out, the Supreme Court of Florida had already
stated that the legislature intended for the December 12, Safe Harbor
date, to be a deadline for completing recounts. Remand would have
62
served no purpose.
Second, Belsky's argument that 3 U.S.C. § 5 is subordinate to the
Constitution is convincing. Section five implements Article II, Section 1
of the Constitution. The power of the state legislature over the manner

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. XII.
Belsky, supra n. 2, at 78. See Posner, supran. 52, at 132-33 & nn. 72-73.
Belsky, supra n. 2, at 78.
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of the selection of the presidential electors
is plenary. This principle was
63
Blacker.
v.
McPherson
in
established
Third, Belsky's observation about the power of Congress under
Article II of the Twelfth Amendment is irrelevant. Article II of the Twelfth
Amendment grants Congress the power to select the President in the
event of a tie in the Electoral College. The Electoral College had not
voted on December 12, 2000.r4 As a consequence, the predicate
condition-a tie in electoral votes-did not exist. Seven Justices of the
United States Supreme Court had, however, determined that the recount
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The power of Congress to resolve a deadlock in the Electoral College does
not help determine the appropriate remedy for such an equal protection
violation.65
Fourth, if the Court had remanded the case to the Florida Supreme
Court and the recount had continued, the result might have been a
"constitutional train wreck." It is frightening to play "What if?" Congress
might have been forced to choose between a group of Florida electors
chosen by the Florida legislature and a separate group of Florida electors
chosen by the Florida Supreme Court. That choice might in turn have
led to more litigation- perhaps even a third United States Supreme
Court case. It might have taken months to choose between Bush and
Gore. It might have been necessary to choose an interim President. 6
Belsky treats the question of the propriety of the remedy as a legal

63. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
64. Belsky, supra n. 2, at 59; Elhauge, supra n. 32, at 29; Posner, supra n. 52, at 13337.
65. Belsky, svpra n. 2, at 60-61; Elhauge, supra n. 32, at 24-33; Posner, supran. 52, at
132-46, 168-69.
66. Professor Einer Elhauge served as counsel for the Florida House of Representatives
during the 2000 election dispute. Professor Elhauge wrote:
The Gore forces were preparing lawsuits seeking a court order blocking any
appointment of electors by the Florida legislature. There was talk of a court order
prohibiting the Florida legislators from meeting to make the appointments, or
barring any legislatively appointed electors from voting in the Electoral College.
Given that the Electoral College had to meet on December 18, this would have left
but a few short days to litigate and resolve all appeals concerning the complex
and never-before-adjudicated issue of whether state legislative appointment was
appropriate when election contests failed to follow state legislative directions or
make a timely choice conclusive on Congress.
Elhauge, supra n. 32, at 29-30. Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago
Law School suggests that the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore "might well have averted
chaos." Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in Vie Vote: Bush, Gore & The Supreme
Court 205-22 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chi. Press 2001). "[A]
genuine constitutional crisis might have arisen. It is not clear how it would have been
settled. No doubt the nation would have survived, but things would have gotten very
messy." Id. The term "constitutional train wreck" is used by Richard H. Pildies in
Democracy and Disorder, in The Vote: Bush, Gore & The Supreme Court 145 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chi. Press 2001). See Posner, supran. 52, at 13739.
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question, not a political question. He advances a legal argument that
the Court ordered the wrong remedy. Because he takes the trouble to
advance arguments, he appears to take the Court's position seriously: he
seems to assume the Court was acting in good faith. To be sure, Belsky
may think the Court was wrong. But courts, like lawyers, make good
faith mistakes all the time. Conclusion: the Bush v. Gore majority acted
in good faith.
B.

Is the argument based on Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution
valid?

Three Justices-Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-joined in a
separate opinion and argued that the Supreme Court of Florida had
violated Article II, § 1, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. Article
II, § 1, clause 2 provides that:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
Belsky gives the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas position short shrift. He
calls their Article II, § 1 concern a "non-issue." According to Belsky,
It is not necessary to spend much time on the criticisms and supporters of
the concurring opinions as to the application of Article II. The
political/legal reality is that [the] concurring Justices [Rehnquist, Scalia
and Thomas did not get the two swing Justices [Kennedy and O'Connor]
on the issue.6 7
The argument that the Supreme Court of Florida violated Article II,
§ 1 deserves more attention and consideration. The argument consists
of six parts.
1. State imposed restrictions on Presidential elections implicate a
"uniquely important" national interest. 68
2. In most cases, the decisions of state courts are "definitive
pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns." In most
cases, principles of comity and federalism would compel the
Court to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state
law..69
3. In exceptional cases, the other branches of a State's government
speak for the State.7 °
4. In the matter of selecting Presidential electors, the State

67.
68.
69.
70.

Belsky, supra n. 2, at 65.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112.
Id
Id.
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legislature speaks for the State. The legislature's authority is
"plenary" according to McPherson v. Blacker, an 1892 decision in
which the Court interpreted Article II, § 1 of the Constitution.7 1
5. The legislature of Florida enacted statutes that govern the
selection of Presidential electors. 2
6. The Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the Florida election
laws in a manner that "impermissibly distorted them beyond
what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II."73
Belsky's discussion of the Article II, § 1 argument is incomplete. In
particular, Belsky ignores the discussion of McPherson v. Blacker in the
Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas concurrence.
In addition, he ignores the
reference to McPherson in the per curiam opinion. 74 A majority of five
Justices believed that the power to choose electors is specifically
entrusted to State legislatures.75
The four dissenters-Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg-also
ignore McPherson. Belsky does not comment upon their failure to deal
with a case the majority believes to be controlling on an important point.
Belsky quotes passages from the dissents of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg. Those passages contain ipse dixit assertions that the Florida
legislature intended the Florida Supreme Court to be involved in the
selection of electors, and that the Florida Supreme Court acted in a
traditional manner.
Belsky also fails to discuss another aspect of the Article II, § 1
argument: that the Supreme Court of Florida distorted the Florida
Election Code. The Florida legislature enacted statutes providing that:
1. The Secretary of State was the Chief Election Officer of Florida.
As Chief Election Officer, the Secretary of State was responsible
for "obtain[ing] and maintain[ing] uniformity in the application,
76
operation and interpretation of the election laws."
2. County election boards-called canvassing boards-were
77
responsible for protest of election returns.
3. Candidates were authorized to initiate protest proceedings. A
protest is a challenge to the propriety of challenge the returns of
an election. The procedure is only available if there is a "error in
the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the

71. Id. at 113.
72. Id. at 113-14.
73. d at 115&n. 1.
74. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104. It is not clear how much support McPherson v.
Blackes provides for the Article II, § 1 argument. On one hand, the relevant parts of
McPhersonappears to be dicta. See Posner, supra n. 52, at 113-114 n. 41. On the other
hand, McPherson is cited by the Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70, 77 (2000) (per curiam).
75. Id.
76. Fla. Stat. § 97.012(1) (2001).
77. Fla. Stat. § 102.166 (2001).
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election."7 8
4. The deadline for completing protest proceedings and certifying
election results is 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day following an
election. Canvassing boards "shall" meet that deadline. The
Secretary of State "may" extend the deadline.79
5. After the votes are certified, a candidate may initiate a contest
proceeding. The contest phase follows the protest phase.80
6. A presumption operates in favor of the actions of the Secretary
of State and the canvassing boards. Such actions are reviewed
for abuse of discretion.8 '
After the November 7, 2000 election, the Florida Supreme Court
changed all six elements of the Florida Election Code set forth above.
First the Florida Supreme Court failed to acknowledge that the
Secretary of State was Chief Election Officer. The Florida Supreme
Court failed to acknowledge that the Secretary of State was responsible
for obtaining and maintaining uniformity in the application, operation
and interpretation of the election laws. 2
Second, the Florida Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the
authority and statutory role of the county canvassing boards.8 3
Third, the Florida Supreme Court expanded the grounds for
initiating a protest. The Florida Supreme Court held that the failure to
consider fully the intent of the voter was an error in the tabulation of
votes.4
Fourth, the Florida Supreme Court extended the statutory deadline
for certifying election results. The Florida Supreme Court ignored the
role of the Secretary of State in determining that deadline. According to
Professor McConnell, one statute said that the Secretary of State "shall"
ignore late-fied returns, and another statute said to "may" ignore latefiled returns. But that provides no support for interpreting the law to
say that she "shall not" ignore them, or to authorize the Court to create

78. Fla. Stat. § 102.166(1)-(5) (2001).
79. Fla. Stat. § 102.111(1) (2001).
80. Fla. Stat. § 102.168 (2001). See Richard A. Epstein, In Such Manner as the
Legislature 7hereofMay Direct The Outcome in Bush v, Gore, in The Vote: Bush, Gore & The
Supreme Court 13, 31 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chi. Press 2001)
("[O]ne has contests about protests, so that the issues raised at the second [contest] phase
are efforts to overturn incorrect decisions at the protest phase.").
81. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d at 1262-73 (dissenting opinions); Krivanek v. Take
Back Tampa Political Committee, 625 So.2d 840, 844-845 (Fla. 1993); Boardman v. Esteva,
323 So.2d 259, 268 n. 5 (Fla. 1975).
82. See Gore v. Harris,772 So.2d at 1262-73 (dissenting opinions); Posner, supra n. 52,
at 102-07, 118; Epstein, supran.80, at 13.
83. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d at 1262-73 (dissenting opinions); Posner, supra n. 52,
at 102-07, 118; Epstein, supra n. 80, at 13. The Florida Supreme Court effectively
eliminated the role of the country canvassing boards, by refusing to defer to them and
reviewing their decisions de novo.
84. See Gore v. Harris,772 So.2d at 1262-73 (dissenting opinions); Posner, supran. 52,
at 102-07, 118; Epstein, supran.80, at 13.
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its own deadline.8 5
Fifth, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a statewide recount. That
recount included counties that had not previously held, or been the
subject of, protest proceedings. In effect, the Florida Supreme Court
abolished the distinction between protests and contests. 6
Sixth, the Florida Supreme Court ignored the presumption in favor
of the actions of the Secretary of State and the canvassing boards. The
Florida 7Supreme Court used the non-deferential de novo standard of
8

review.

For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that the Florida Supreme Court
changed the law intended to govern Presidential elections by the Florida
legislature. The Florida Supreme Court "changed the rules in the middle
of the game."88 Changing the rules in the middle of the game is normally
not consistent with "fairness" and "justice." A rule is fair if it is
formulated undera "veil of ignorance"-at a time when decision-makers
do not know whether they will be helped or hurt by a specific
formulation.8 9 The Florida Supreme Court changed the rules to benefit
Gore.90 In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court acted in a manner that
was not permitted by federal law. 9 1

85. Michael W. McConnell, Two and a Half Cheersfor Bush v. Gore, in The Vote: Bush,
Gore & The Supreme Court 109 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chi. Press
2001).
86. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
[Underlying the extension of the certification deadline and the short changing of
the contest period was, presumably, the clear implication that certification was a
matter of significance: The certified winner would enjoy presumptive validity,
making the contest proceeding by the loosing candidate an uphill battle. In its
latest opinion, however, the [Florida Supreme] Court emptied certification of
virtually all legal consequence during the contest, and in doing so, departs from
the provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature.
Bushv. Gore, 531 U.S. at 118.
87. Gore v. Harris,772 So.2d at 1252.
88. Ronald A. Main & Jeremy B. Bash, The Labor of Sisyphus: The Gore Recount
Perspective, in Overtimel The Election 2000 Thriller 166 (Larry J. Sabato ed., Longman
2001).
89. Adrien Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in ConstitutionalLaw, 111 Yale L.J. 399,
399-403 (2001).
90. See Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, in The Vote: Bush, Gore & The Supreme
Court 65 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chi. Press 2001); Elhange, supra
n. 32, at 26 ("Choosing the standard was tantamount to choosing the president.").
91. According to Issacharoff:
It is entirely fair to read 3 U.S.C. § 5 as codifying an important principle of
electoral democracy requiring the rules of engagement to be explicated ex ante
and to be fairly immutable under the strain of electoral conflict. The basic
premise is that election officials, who are mostly partisan figures, cannot be
trusted to improve electoral remedies once the impact of their decisions is known
and the temptation toward self-serving behavior becomes irresistible.
Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, in The Vote: Bush, Gore & The Supreme Court 65
(Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chi. Press 2001). Issacharoff refers the ex
ante formulation of rules as "precomnitment." Id. at 65-66.
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C. Did the Bush v. Gore majority betray the principles of the "New
Federalism?"
Belsky notes that Bush v. Gore has been criticized because
"supposed 'states rights' Justices overruled a state's highest court."9 2 He
describes Justice O'Connor as "a defender of deference to the state
courts, especially when state law is involved." 93
He calls Justice
Kennedy "a strong and articulate proponent of states as 'sovereign
powers' independent of action by the federal judiciary and of letting
state
" 94
powers.
state
and
law
federal
between
conflicts
resolve
courts
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to form the majority in a line
of cases that is sometimes described as the "New Federalism." These
cases hold that various statutes enacted by Congress are, in effect, ultra
vires-that they exceed the scope of the limited, enumerated powers of
95
the federal government and invade the sovereignty of the states.
Bush v. Gore does not involve any issue of the validity of a federal
statute. Bush v. Gore involves the constitutionality of recounts of votes
ordered by a state supreme court. As a result, there is no inconsistency
between the Court's "New Federalism" jurisprudence and Bush v. Gore.
The suggestion that the "states rights" Justices are acting in an
inconsistent (or even a hypocritical) manner are not well founded.
"Federalism does not create a free-fire zone where states may do
96
anything they please."
One other point regarding federalism should be mentioned. It is
possible to read Bush v. Gore as a reaffirmation of federal judicial
supremacy. The United States Supreme Court had previously vacated a
decision of the Florida Supreme Court that favored Gore. 97 The Florida
Supreme Court ignored that decision, and continued to treat its prior
opinion as good law. Such conduct by a state court is not merely
presumptuous and arrogant; it is inconsistent with the Supremacy

92. Belsky, supra n. 2, at 72.
93. Id. at 73.
94. Id.
95. See e.g. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against
Women Act as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
exceeded the remedial powers of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. v.
Lopez, 515 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the prohibition of firearms possession in areas
adjacent and proximate to schools was beyond the power of Congress). See Michael S.
Greve, Real Federalism: Why it Matters, How it Could Happen (AEI Press 1999); Ronald D.
Rotunda, The New States' Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause, and the
ProposedNew Avocation, 25 Okla. C. L. Rev. 869 (2000).
96. Michael S. Greve, The Real Division in the Court: Neither the Conservative Nor the
Liberal Justices Were Hypocritical They Just Have Fundamentally Different Views of
Federalism,in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 323-30 (E.J. Dionne, Jr.
& William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
97. Bush v. Palm Beach CanvassingBd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
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Clause of the Constitution. 98
D.

Can Bush v. Gore be reconciled with PlannedParenthoodof
SoutheasternPennsylvaniav. Casey?

Critics of Bush v. Gore denounce the decision for nationalizing
issues that should be left to state law, and for inventing new
constitutional rights.
These, of course, are the criticisms that
conservatives have traditionally leveled at the Court's abortion
decisions-the decisions finding a federal right to an abortion in the
penumbras of the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
The first abortion decision, Roe v. Wade,99 was reaffirmed in
Planned Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey. 00 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy cast the decisive swing votes. They voted with
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer.
As a general matter, liberal critics of Bush v. Gore favor a federal
right to abortion; they favor Roe v. Wade and Casey. They fear Bush
because he might appoint a new Rehnquist, Scalia, or Thomas and pave
the way for the reversal of Roe v. Wade.10 ' Interestingly, Dershowitz is so
anxious to condemn Bush v. Gore that he criticizes Roe v. Wade as a
political decision:
The lessons of Roe v. Wade and Bush v. Gore are not easy to distill, but at
bottom they represent opposite sides of the same currency of judicial
activism in areas more appropriately left to the political processes. Courts
ought not to jump into controversies that are political in nature and are
capable of being resolved-even if not smoothly or expeditiously-by the
popular branches of government. Judges have no special competence,
qualifications, or mandate to decide between equally compelling moral
claims (as in the abortion controversy) or equally compelling political
claims (counting ballots by hand or stopping the recount because the
standard is ambiguous). Absent clear governing constitutional principles
(which are not present in either case), these are precisely the sorts of
issues that should be left to0 the
rough-and-tumble of politics rather than
2
the ipse dixit of five justices.1
There is only one problem: in Casey, O'Connor and Kennedy were
liberals.
More conservative commentators see Casey in a different light:
Casey involves a major, high profile issue-abortion. Bush v. Gore
involves a major, high profile issue-selection of the President of the
United States. In both cases, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy voted in
98. U.S. Const. art. VI. See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw
1.5 to 1.6 (6th ed., West 2000) (discussing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816)).
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
101. There are, of course, liberal critics of Bush v. Gore. See Rosen, supra n. 8, at 312.
102. Dershowitz, supran. 11, at 194.
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favor of an active role for the Court. From that perspective, O'Connor
and Kennedy voted consistently in both Casey and Bush v. Gore.
Belsky does not discuss Casey. It would be interesting to know
what he thinks about the relationship between Casey and Bush v. Gore.
E.

Is Bush v. Gorejust anotherbattle in the Culture Wars?

Belsky does not discuss the Culture Wars -the never-ending battle
between the forces Dean William Powers of the University of Texas calls
the "nudes" and the "prudes." Nudes include Hugh Hefner, Bill Clinton,
Jane Fonda, J. M. Keynes, and Alan Dershowitz. Prudes include William
F. Buckley, Jr., George Washington, John Wayne, Winston Churchill,
and Antonin Scalia.
Professor Harvey Mansfield of Harvard University has described
Bush v. Gore as a "contest of principle between two parties" -the
Republicans and the Democrats. According to Mansfield,
The Republicans stand for the rule of law, and the Democrats for the rule
of the people. And the Democrats, because they stand for the rule of the
people, believe that rule should be paramount, and that technicalities are
subordinate to that will. Whereas the Republicans believe in doing things
properly or legally. 103

Is this description fair? Gore and his supporters gathered under
the slogan "Count every vote." They emphasized that Gore was the
people's choice. Bush emphasized compliance with rules, and protested
against "changing the rules in the middle of the game." '°4
Mansfield's description of the competing principles seems fair. It
also seems familiar. These principles always clash. Over twenty-five
years ago, Alexander Bickel wrote:
Two diverging traditions in the mainstream of Western political thoughtone "liberal," the other "conservative"-have competed, and still compete,
for control of the democratic process and of the American constitutional
system; both have controlled the direction of our judicial policy at one time
or another.
One of these, the contractarian tradition, began with the moderate
common sense of John Locke. It was pursued by Rousseau, and it long
ago captured, and substantially retains possession of, the label liberal,
although I would contest its title to it. The other tradition can, for lack of a
better term, be called Whig in the English eighteenth-century sense. It is
usually called conservative, and I would associate it chiefly with Edmund
103. Harvey C. Mansfield, What We'll Remember In 2050, The Chronicle of Higher
Education, in Bush v. Gore, The Court Cases and the Commentary 341 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. &
William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001). See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
History 141 (U. Chi. Press 1953) (-The political problem consists in reconciling the
requirement for wisdom with the requirement for consent... the rule of law is to take the
place of the rule of men, however wise.").
104. Klain & Bash, supran.91, at 166.
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Burke. This is my own model.

795

10 5

The model of Burke and Bickel is also my model.1 0 6 I believe that it may
be the model of the Bush v. Gore majority.
In contrast, the model of Gore, Dershowitz, and of the Bush v. Gore
defenders -particularly Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsberg-seems
to be what Bickel describes as the "Liberal Contractarian Model." "The
Liberal Contractarian Model rests on a vision of individual rights that
have a clearly defined, independent existence predating society and are
derived from nature and from a natural, if imagined, contract." 0 7 The
Liberal Contractarian Model embraces majoritarism. "In the political
process, majoritarism is everything for the liberal contractarian. The vote
is all important, the franchise must be universally available, absolute
equality of the vote and equality of the size of constituencies are
essential." 1'
In other words, every vote must count.
The liberal contractarian view justifies strong beliefs and strong
emotions. "Nothing is easier for strong-minded, compassionate men, the
true believers, who are given, in the phrase of Richard Hofstadter, to
'self-assertive subjectivism' -nothing
is easier for such a man to
attribute their passionate beliefs to a monolithic abstraction called the
people or the Constitution. " ' ° 9
The Whig model, in contrast, "begins not with theoretical rights but
with a real society, whose origins in the historical mists it acknowledges
to be mysterious. " n ° According to Bickel, the Whig model "rests on
mature skepticism.""' Significantly, exponents of the Whig model define
"the people" in a way that is different from the liberal contractarian

105. Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 3 (Yale U. Press 1975). Alexander
Bickel (1924-1974) was born in Romania and graduated summa cun laude from Harvard
Law School. Bickel clerked for Justice Felix Frankfurter during the 1952 Supreme Court
term. He assisted Justice Frankfurter in preparing a memorandum urging that Brown v.
Board of Education be reargued. Bickel taught Constitutional Law at Yale Law School,
represented the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers Case (1971), and defended
President Richard M. Nixon's order firing Archibald Cox as the Watergate special
prosecutor. See Alan M. Dershowitz, N.Y. Times Book Rev. (Sept. 21, 1975) (reviewing The
Morality of Consent) (reprinted in Alan M. Dershowitz, Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a
Trbulent Age 383-87 (Little, Brown & Co. 2002)).
The Morality of Consent was Bickers last book. It represents his mature views in a
way that his prior works do not. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of
JudicialReview 71-72 (Harv. U. Press 1980) (-Ihe Odyssey of Alexander Bickel"); Thomas
Sowell, A Conflict of Visions 59 & nn. 89-91 (Basic 2002). Justice Breyer quoted an earlier
book by Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, in his dissent in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at
156.
106. See Steven K. Balman, Book Review, 17 Tulsa L.J. 811, 821-22 (1982) (reviewing The
Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activity of Two Supreme Court
Justices,by Bruce Allen Murphy).
107. Bickel, supran. 105, at 4.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 9.
110. IdUat4.
111. Id.
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model. To the Whigs, "[the people are something else than a majority
registered on election day, although we elect various majorities,
including electoral ones, settle various things and various contexts on
various occasions."1 1 2 The people means more than a momentary
numerical majority. 13
The people, then, are parties to a contract that includes the dead,
the living, and those yet unborn." 4 Burke suggested that the two views,
to some extent, "rival follies."" 5 Bickel suggested that the rival follies
were engaged in an unrelenting war." 6 That war influences politics and

institutions.

117

In Bush v. Gore, the Whigs declared and pursued agnostic
objectives. They asked all parties-the candidates, the state officials,
the Florida Supreme Court-to play by rules adopted before the
election. Gore, in contrast, acted as a "true believer." He was willing to
change the rules in the middle of the game in order to "achieve the
true
8
ends of government"-that is, the ends as he understood them. "

112. Id. at 17.
113. See Bickel, supran. 105, at 17.
114. See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (originally published
1790). in Russell Kirk, The Portable Conservative Reader (Viking 1982).
115. Bickel, supran. 105, at 11. According to Bickel,
The people, as Burke used the term, was a body in place, gathered, lead,
manifesting its temper in many ways and over a span of time as a whole, or as
one another sizable community within the whole body, not speaking merely on
occasion in momentary numerical majorities. The influence of the people so
conceived must be in common because their consent is essential. That consent
may be withdrawn regardless of elections: it must be preponderant, not merely
majority consent, and is yielded not only and even chiefly to the electoral verdict.
but to institutions validated by time and familiarity and composed from time to
time with men who are trusted because they are seen to have 'a connection with
the interest-the sentiments and opinion of the people.
Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 18 ("Safeguards against arbitrary power, resistance to total power, assurance
of stable government, which is responsive and capable of generating long-term consentthese are agnostic objectives. Any true believer will want total power to achieve the true
ends of government, and will be a democrat of an authoritarian depending, as Burke said,
on which scheme or system he thinks will bring him nearer to total power.").
118. On November 27, 2000, Gore stated:
Every four years there's one day when the people have their say. In many ways
the act of voting and having that vote counted is more important than who wins
the majority of the votes that are cast, because whoever wins, the victor will know
that the American people have spoken with a voice made mighty by the whole of
its integrity.
On that one day every four years the poor, as well as the rich, the weak as well as
the strong, women and men alike, citizens of every race, creed and color, of
whatever infirmity or political temper, are all equal. They're equal, that is, so long
as all of their votes are counted.... Ignoring votes means ignoring democracy
itself. And if we ignore the votes of thousands in Florida and this election, how
can you or any American have confidence that your vote will not be ignored in a
future election?... This is America. When votes are cast, we count them. We
don't arbitrarily set them aside because it's too difficult to count them.
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Gore and his supporters seemed animated by an attitude of moral
certitude. Bickel counseled skepticism:
If we allow ourselves to become engulfed in moral certitudes, we will
march to self-destruction from one Vietnam and one domestic
revolution-sometimes Marcusean and often not-to anbther. And yet we
do need, individually and as a society, some values, some belief in the
foundations of our conduct, in order to make life bearable. If these two
are lies, they are, as Holmes's great contemporary, Joseph Conrad,
thought them, true lies: If illusions,
then indispensable ones. To abandon
I19
them is to commit moral suicide.
It is not necessary to commit moral suicide. As Justice Jackson
famously observed, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."120 The
procedures and the technicalities, so disparaged by Gore and his
supporters, are necessary to our survival. The decision in Bush v. Gore
constitutes recognition by an institution imbued with the will of the
people, of the need for rules. As a consequence, Bush v. Gore
represents
21
a triumph of the rule of law, at least under the Whig view.'
The Whig view, of course, is not the only view. Gore and his
supporters, on and off the Court, have a different view. If I am correct,
their view is what Bickel called the liberal contractarian view. To quote
my favorite legal scholar, Nero Wolfe, "[tiheir viewpoint, of course, is
valid to them. " 1 22 Gore's moral certainties compelled him to become the
first person in 113 years to contest a Presidential election.123 A Whig
would not be able to reconcile personal ambition with national interest
in the way chosen by Gore. In 1960, Richard Nixon found himself in a
position similar to Gore's. Nixon chose not to contest the election of
John F. Kennedy. Significantly, Nixon discouraged others from raising
questions about Kennedy's 1960 campaign victory: Nixon talked a
reporter for the New York Herald Tribune out of writing a series of
articles on election fraud, arguing that "Our country can't afford the
agony of a constitutional crisis-and I damn well will not be a party to
24
creating one, just to become president or anything else."
In summary, Bush v. Gore can be seen as a battle in the Cultural
Wars. Although the case helped make George W. Bush President of the
United States, it is not necessary to see the result as narrowly partisan.

See Bush v. Gore-Election2000 41 (Lexis-Nexis eds., LEXIS L. Publg. 2001). On the same
day, Gore's running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, stated: "How can we teach our children
that every vote counts if we are not willing to make a good-faith effort to count every vote?"
Id. at 43.
119. Bickel, supra n. 105, at 77.
120. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
121. See Mansfield, supra n. 103.
122. Stout, supran.53, at 34.
123. Elhauge, supran.32, at 31.
124. 36 Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000 PresidentialElectionxviii (John Wright
et al. eds., Times Books 2001).
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Broad philosophies clash is Bush v. Gore: the rule of law triumphs over
anarchic, freewheeling "equity." Bush's appeals to due process and
fairness prevail over Gore's passionate solipsistic improvisation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Much of the criticism of Bush v. Gore was shrill, passionate, and
angry.
That criticism was largely unfounded as a matter of
constitutional law. A cooler, more detached approach to criticism-the
Belsky approach-is possible. That approach balances the persuasive
aspects of the opinions against their faults and shortcomings, and will
better stand the test of time. Judge Posner has suggested that much of
the criticism of Bush v. Gore-including criticism by law professorswas "ill-informed, premature, and inaccurate." 125
Belsky could have made the same criticism as Judge Posner.
Instead, Belsky chose to emphasize the positive and substantive
contributions of the various commentators on Bush v. Gore, including
the shrill commentators. By accentuating the positive, Belsky makes it
possible to move past the emotional displays of the shrill commentators
and to evaluate the merits of their arguments. Something, however, is
lost in the translation. Walter Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche
turned a nihilist into a liberal; 126 Belsky's mediation of the shrill
commentators turned partisans into moderates.
Belsky filters the
commentator's resentment of the Court's action, and mutes their
anguish over Bush's victory.
My main criticism of Belsky's article is that it was too short: he did
not have the chance to fully explore several important issues raised by
Bush v. Gore. It would have been interesting to read a balanced,
reasoned discussion of the Article II, § 1 argument and of the federalism
issues. It would have been very interesting to know Belsky's answers to
125. Richard A. Posner, The Professor's Profess, A. Mthly 28 (Feb. 2002). Judge Posner

wrote:
Concerning the election deadlock, professors en mass, long before they could
have mastered the intricacies of election law and the election statistics, said that
Bush had stolen the election; that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices were corrupt;
that the decision in Bush v. Gore was the worst decision in the history of the
Court (worse than, for example, the decision in the Dred Scott case, which is
sometimes blamed for the Civil War). Several of our most distinguished
constitutional theorists argued in the New York Times that 'there is a good reason
to believe that Vice President Gore has been elected President by a clear
constitutional majority of the popular vote and the electoral college,' even though
it is elementary that a popular vote majority has absolutely no constitutional
significance for the election of the president....
It was regrettable-and, indeed an embarrassment to academia-that so much
of their talk was ill informed, premature, and inaccurate.
Id See Richard A. Posner, PublicIntellectuals: A Study of Decline 39 (Harv. U. Press 2001)
(to the same effect).
126. See Walter Kaufman, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (4th ed.,
Princeton U. Press 1974).
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the questions that flow from his conclusion that the Bush v. Gore
decision was political-Was Bush v. Gore decided in good faith? Was
Bush v. Gore a battle in the Culture Wars?
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